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Chapter 3 
Minor Colombian Merchandise Exports* 
Chapter I discussed briefly the different behavior of' ntraditional" 
or major ( coffee and crude petroleum) and 11non-traditional" or minor Colombi en 
merchandise exports since 1948. It was also noted that given the limited 
growth possibilities for coffee and oil exports, especially since the mid­
nineteen fifties, the expansion of minor exports has been a 1':ey rolicy target. 
This chapter will explore the commodity composition of' minor exports, their 
geographical destination, as well as other characteristics, hoping to draw 
up a typology of these very heterogeneous commodities. An attempt will be 
made to explain why the efforts to expand and diversify Colombian exports 
has been, on the whole, rather successful. Such an attel?lpt will build on 
the substantial work of other authors.
1 Ideally one would like to account 
for the annual growth rate of about ten percent per annum in registered 
minor exports between 1950-51-52 and 1968-69-70, as well as for deviations 
around that trend. The chapter will close with a discussion of the outlook 
for non-traditional exports, and with an evaluation o~ the role minor exports 
cen be expected to pla;y in achieving Colombian growth, employment and distri­
butional targets. 
An Overall View 
It ma;y be seen from Table III-1 that during 1950-51-52 coffee represented 
77 percent of Colombia's (non-contraband) merchandise exports, with crude 
petroleum accounting for an additional 15 percent. These figures were about 
unchanged for 1957-58-59. By 1968-69-70, however, the residual category, 
minor registered exports, had reached 31 percent, while the coffee share 
had slipped to 61 percent. Indeed, the expansion in the dollar value of 
minor exports between 1957-58-59 and 1968-69-70 accounts for more then the 
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Table III-1 
Colombian Merchandise Exports, f.o.b. 
(Million Current U.S. Dollars; Trade Returns) 
Total Registered Registered Registered Registered Non-Registered 
Merchandise Coffee Crude "Minorii Merchandise 
Exports Petroleum :Exports Exports 
1950 393.6 306.3 64.5 22.8 n.a. 
1951. 483.8 359.4 73.5 50.9 n.a. 
1952 483.0 379.9 71.5 31.6 n.a. 
1953 605.5 492.3 76.3 36.9 n.a. 
1954 669.1 550.2 75.8 43.1 2.4 
1955 596.7 487.4 61.5 47.8 8.6 
1956 551.6 413.1 69.9 68.6 70.6 
1957 511.1 388.8 76.3 46.o 78.8 
1958 460.7 354.5 66.6 39.6 66.4 
1959 473.0 361.2 73.3 38.5 69.0 
1960 464.6 332.3 80.0 52.3 55.0 
1961 434.5 308.0 68.2 58.2 35.0· 
1962 463.4 332.2 60.6 10.6 35.0 
1963 446.7 303.l 11.2 66.3 25.0 
1964 548.1 394.4 75.0 78.8 35.0 
1965 539.1 344.o 88.2 107.0 40.0 . 
1966 507.6 328.3 71.7 107.6 42.0 
1967 509.9 322.4 61.2 126.3 43.0 
1968 558.2 351.5 36.3 170.3 40.0 
1969 607.5 343.9 56.7 206.9 43.0 
1970 731.6 466.9 58.6 206.1 59.0 
1971. 399.1 51.2 
Sources a..11d I'!ethod: IYF-IFS and I:-IF-BOrY. Note tl1at the latter publication also 
corrects for timing and valuation when translating coffee exports, as shown in 
trade returns, into those presented in the :Balance of Payments. The timing 
correction arises from changes in coffee stocl:s held abroad by Colombirn institutions• 
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growth in total registered exports between those two dates, as the very 
slight increase in coffee exports was insufficient to compensate the decline 
in crude petroleum exports. The average annual growth rate in the value 
of registered minor exports, which was a meagre 2.4 percent between 1950-51-52 
and 1957-58-59, rose to an impressive 15.1 percent between the latter date 
and 1968-69-70. 
A glance at Table III-1 will show that the expansion of registered minor 
exports has been far from steady. The point emerges more clearly from the 
following tabulation, indicating the number of years which registered the 
year-to-year percentage changes shown: 
Year-to-year percentage Whole 1951 1961 
change in value of registered Per5od through through 
minor exports of: -- 1960 1970 
More than 40 percent 2 2 0 
From 20 to 40 percent 5 1 4 
From 10 to 20 percent 6 3 3 
From Oto 10 percent 1 0 1 
From -10 to O percent 3 l 2
__3_Less than -10 percent 3 0 
20 years 10 yea.rs 10 years 
While the diversification and bigger base of minor exports during the 
1960's yielded less desparate year-to-year changes in their total value, a 
considerable spread remained. During that more recent period one mey note 
three major export surges, preceded and followed by absolute declines or 
stagnation in the export level: those of 1960 through 1962; 1964-65 and, 
the most impressive of all, 1967 through 1969. 
The ample opportunities which Colombian geography provides for inward 
smuggling activities were noted in Chapter II. Overvalued exchange rates, 
exPort truces and prohibitions, as well as export quotas on some commodities 
(such as coffee) and old-fashion~d criminal activities (as with emeralds) 
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have provided the incentives for outwe.rd smuggling, or non-registered 
merchandise exports. It is common knowledge that considerable amounts 
of cattle, textiles, coffee and other goods cross every year, unregistered, 
from Colombia to Venezuela and Ecuador. Colombian emeralds find their WfJ¥ 
to European markets in mysterious, unregistered ways. Estimates of the value 
of such trade are naturally gross ; unusual external events , such as the 
Venezuelan boom of 1956-58, as well as changes in domestic policies lead 
to variations in the level of smuggling, but only the rough outlines of 
those fluctuations have been estimated. The last column of Table III-1 
presents the most reputable of those calculations, covering_ all commodities. 
According to those figures, non-registered exports reached 14 percent of 
the value of registered exports during 1956 through 1960, and declined to 
7 percent during 1968-69-70. 
Most non-registered exports can be classified as minor, as mey be seen 
in the last column of Table III-2. Thus, during 1957 through 1959 more 
minor exports seem to have left Colombia unregistered than registered. 
While not too much weight should be placed on the smuggling estimates, it 
does appear that a small part of the expansion in registered minor exports 
observed between 1957-58-59 and 1968-69-70 took place at the expense of 
smuggling. Adding up registered and unregistered minor exports, one obtains 
growth rates of 15.8 percent per annum between 1950-51-52 and 1957-58-59, 
and of 8.2 percent per annum between 1957-58-59 and 1968-69-70. This latter 
growth rate, while not as spectacular as the 15.1 percent per annum obtained 
for Just registered minor exports, is still remarkable. In particular, 
while the surge observed for registered minor exports during 1960 through 1962 
mey represent to an important extent the replacement of smuggling for legal 
-3a-
Table III-2 
Colombian Hinor Exports, f.o.b. 
(Hi.llion Current U.S. Dollars ) 
Registered Other Non-RegisteredRegistered Tobacco, Sugar, Cotton 
and Fresh Fruit (mainly Bananas) Einor Exports Hiner 
Exports 
Uon-LA..~A LAFTA Non-LAFTA LAFTA 
Countries Countries Countries Countries -----
1950 ----~----10.6--------­ -----12.2----­
n.a. 
1951 a•---------10.8--------­ ~-----40.l----­ n.a. 
------20.7----- n.a.1952 -----------10.9--------- n.a.
1953 --...------··-14.1--------- ------22.8------------27,4----- 2.41954 -----------15.7---------
-------28.8----- 8.61955 16.0------36.9-----1956 ------------31. 7----·----- 11.5 5.2 60.01957 29. 4 4.o 55,018.21958 17 .5 18.8 3.8 55.01959 15.9
1960 28.8 17.9 5.6 
45.0
18.1 6.2 25.01961 33.0 0.9
0.9 24.5 6.6 25.01962 38.6 
1.1 25.6 5.4 .a 15.01963 34.3 o.4 37.1 10.2 25.01964 31.1 
0.2 48.1 17.2 12.01965 41.5 44.7 25.9 13.01966 36.8 0.2 
48. 7 19.8 28.01967 57.1 0.7 72.0 24.7 30.01968 68.0 5.6
2.1 96.7 34.6 33.01969 73.5 53.0
· 1970 ' 
Sources and Method: Basic deta obtained from D.AHE-ADCE, sever
al issues, and 
UN-FAO-TY, also several issues. 
exports,_ l?ost-1963 advances cannot be questioned on those grounds. The 
combined series for all minor exports shows an average annual growth rate 
of 18 percent between 1963 and 1970. 
Types of tanor Exports 
Colombian minor exports are made up by a diversified list of commodities. 
The five major i terns in that list during 1969 (cotton, bananas, sugar, 
tu.el-oil and cotton textiles) accounted for less than half of registered 
minor exports. Furthermore, during the 1960 1 s new items were constantly 
added to the list, which by now includes such various products as gold, 
paper and cardboard, meat, tobacco, wood, shoes, seafood, glass, oilseed 
cakes, chemicals, furs, cement, hides, precious stones, tires, books, flowers 
and dog toys. Note that many minor exports are hardly 11non-traditional"; 
Colombia has been exporting tobacco, for example, since she was a Spanish 
colony. 
There are a priori reasons to suspect that some types of minor exports 
are likely to have different domestic supply price-elasticities than others. 
Factor proportions as well as foreign demand income-elasticities are also 
likely to differ sharply between, say, cement and flowers. Data needed to 
classify minor exports according to those different criteria are not yet 
available, so somewhat looser but more convenient classificatory schemes 
will be pursued. 
One such scheme (among the many possible) can be derived from Tables III-2 
and III-3, and is sUI!lr.larized as follows: 
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Share in Registered Average Annual 
Minor E~;::ports Growth Rate 1957-58-59/ 
1957-58-59 1967-68-69 1967-68-69 
··Bananas , cot·~on, 
suga,r, tob::1.cco 50.6% 41.1% 12.7% 









Four important primary products still account for more than forty percent 
of registered minor expor_ts; it is remarkable that, in spite of their being 
labelled primary products, their dollar value grew at an impressive annual 
rate. Both manufactured goods and the residua]_, minor/minor, category are 
far from homogeneous groups ; a closer look at each of the three sub-groups 
is in order. 
Bananas, Cotton. Sug&r and Tobacco (BCST) 
It is sometimes asserted that before a developing country can expand 
its exports and diversifJ mray from its traditional staple, it must go 
through a process of import-substituting industrialization. Clearly industriali-
zation ~-tas not a precondition for expar1dir1g Colom.bi&-i BCST e.:-:ports from 
s.nnue.J. leYels of $11 Million during 1950-51-52 to ~21 Million during 1957-58-59 
and $69 Mil-lion for 1967-68-69. The expansion of BCST exports between the 
last two dates accoUJ.ited for 38 percent of the total increase in registered 
minor e:>..-porl!"; cotton; by i.tself, is responsible for 20 percent of that 
expansion, with sugar providing another I2 percent. Import substitution in 
bananas, sugar or tobacco was not a preliminary step to exporting; for 
cotton, however, the story is different, as j_t will be seen below. 
Comparative edva;.1tage for these four commodities is rooted in the 
avsilability of Co:_or.1bian natural resources, working within a certain range 
-5a-Table III-3 
· •o. •, accor ~ ~~~~ ·~~~·(Revised)Registered Minor Colom
1bian Merchandise Exports, f b dinp; to SITC 
(Million Current U.S. Dollars) 
1969 1968 1967 1966 1965 1964 1963 1962 1961 1960 1959 19~6. 1957 
o Food and live animals , 
excl. coffee 63.1 53,5 45,3 41.3 40.1 18.6 22.4 20.9 21.1 15 .li. 15.5 16.1 26.9051 Fresh fruits and nuts 
(bananas) 19,9 24.7 25.0 20.0 18.6 12.4 13,3 10,7 14.1 13,7 13.9 15,5 26.2061 Sugar and honey 15.6 15.9 12.9 9,1 7.8 3,3 5,5 7,4 5.2 0 00 0.3--- Other 27.6 12.9 7.4 12.2 13,7 2,9 3.6 2.8 1.8 1.7 1.6 o.6 · o.4
1 Beveraees and tobacco 7,3 4.9 4.4 5,6 7,2 9,5 7,3 5,7 4.1 2.4 2.0 2.012.l Tobacco, unmanufactured 7,3 2.94.9 4.4 5.6 7.2 9.4 7,2---Other 5.7 4.o 2.4 2.0 2.0 2,90 0 0 0 0 0.1 0.1 0 0.1 0 0 0 02 Crude materials, inedible, 
excl. fuels 45,9 38.7 21.6 8.4 15,7 13.226.3 Cotton 13.9 19.2 13.) 15.3 2.832,8 28.1 15,5 2.3 6.4 2.6 3.2 ---Others 8.1 9,5 15,8 10.6 12.7 013,1 10.6 G.1 6.1 7,6 6.8 0 04.4 3, lf 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.6 3.23 Mineral fuels, lubricants, 
etc. excl. Crude Petroleum 20,3 14.4 13.5 9,7 7.94 Anhial and vegetable oils 1-9 li.6 7,4 6.o 7,8 8,9 10.1 5,0and fats 0 0 0 0 0 0 05 Chemicals 0.1 0 010.0 8,(-; lr. 7 6.6 6.1 4.4 0 0 06 !Ianufacturecl goods clas- 2.4 2,7 1.4 1.3 1.0 1.0 0.8sified by mat. 49.1 40,9 31.4 30.2 24.1 19.67 ~!achinery and transport 11.3· 10.0 6.3 3.4 4.4 3.9 4.oequipme::;.t 5,1 4.2 3.4 3,6 2.08 Miscellaneous manufactured 1.9 1.7 1.1 2.0 2.1 1.0articles 0.5 0.85.5 4.6 1.89 Commodities and Trans., 2.2 2.6 1.8 0.8 0.5 o.4 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5n.e.s. o.6 o.6 0.1 0 l.O 1.9 2.1Total 3.1 3.2 3.9 2.6 3.2206.9 170.3 126.3 1.9107.6 107.0--Frui t.s, Sugar, Tobacco, 78.8 66,3 70.6_Gotton ,28.2 52.3 38.5 39.6 46.o75.6 73.6 57.8 37.0--Manufactm·ed goeds 41.7 31.5 35.5 39.6 33,9 28.8 -(3, 5, 6, 7, plus 8) 15.9 17,5 29.490.6 72.7 54.8 52.3 42. '( 35.6 20.8--Other (Minor/minor) 40.7 24.o 13,7 21.7 16.1 14.8 15.6 15.8 11.118.3 22.6 11.7 10.0 9.3 8.2 8.7 1.0Sources and Method: 6.3 5.5 
Basic data obtained j:'rom DAIIJE-ADCE, several issues, and tJ:.IT-YOITS, several issue.s •. 
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for labor and transport costs. By themselves, of course, these factors 
do not explain the level of BCST exports actually achieved during the post­
war, nor their g:cm1th rate. 
The relative homogeneity of the BCST group allows us to develop," besides 
dollar value time series, both export quantll!ll. and unit value series. These 
are presented in Table III-4. These figures show that the rapid growth in the 
dollar value of BCST exports between 1957-58-59 and 1967-68-69 was based on 
quantum expa~sion ( ave:;.~aging 16. 5 percent per annum), with unit c"_ollar prices 
samedeclinini; between those two dat'=s. It can l:..lso be seen that during the 
interval, domestic output of these crops grew at a significan.tly lower than 
the export quantmn (8.8 percent v~ 16.5 percent). 
The evolution of the BCS'l' export unit V'.3.l"'Je presents some interesting 
characteristics. One may note, first of all, its instability. For the years 
1957 through lS/69, that price instability has been greater than that for coffee; 
the average yeo:-to-year change in coffee prices {disregarding signs) was 
7.5 percent, while that for BCST unit value was 10.3 percent. During the 
difficult 1957-58-59 years, both coffee and BCST plunged, and the crisis cf 
_the second half of 1966 was aggravated by the simultaneous deterioration of 
coffee and BCST prices. (It will be seen in a later chapter that 1966 Colombian 
authorities argueJ. that such exogenous price decline should not be allowed to 
influence exchange rate policy. Foreign creditors tended to ignore this point 
and pressed their s.dv.::mtage.) On the whole, however, end fortunate:i.y for 
Colombia, the correlation co~fficient between dollar coffee prices and the BCST 
export unit value is not strong (a ~ositive R of 0.44), at least for 1957 
through 1969. It IDS¥ be too much to expect that diversification will 
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Table III-4 
Value, Quantum, Price end Production Ind.ices for 
B8.!lanas, Cotton, Sugar end Tobacco {BCST) 
(Averages for 1957-69 = 100) 
Export &port Export Quantum o-r 
Dollar Quantum Unit Domestic 
Valt:e Value Production---· 
1950 26.6 us na 35.7 
1951 .27.1 na na 38.4 
1952 27.4 n~1, na 39.5
51.51953 35.4 na na 
n3. na 59.71954 39.4 
n~, 60.21955 47.7 na 
1956 79.6 ;.1a na 61.6 
1957 73.7 40. 8 180.6 54.7 
37.0 118.8 57.81958 43.9 
81.71959 39.9 42.8 93.3 
1960 72.3 75.0 96.5 87.4
90.81961 85.2 90.6 94.1 
1962 99.3 88.2 112.5 90.4 
1963 88.8 83.3 106.6 91.4 
1964 79.1 73,T 107.3 84.7 
1965 104.7 101.4 103.3 95-3 
1966 92.9 lC9.7 84.6 115.8 
1967 145.2 161.2 90.1 132.9 
1968 185.1 202.6 91.3 160.2 
1969 189.9 193.6 98.0 156.9 
Export quantum a.-rid value data for each of the commoditiesSources and Eethod: 
Domestic output :for each of the coinmoditiesobtained from DAl.'lE-ADCE, several issues. 
obtained from BdlR-CN. The composite index for the whole group was obtained by 
using the following w~ights, bused on the share of each of the commodities in their 
total export vo.lue (in dollars) during 1957 through 1969: 
Bananas (fruit) 44.04% 
Cotton 27. 40 
Sugar 16.02 
Tobacco 12. 54 
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Table III-4 (continued) 
The same weights were ~sed to obtain the export and domestic production quantum 
indices. The export unit value index was obtained using the export value and 
quantum indices. The Llethod of' calculating the export quantum neglects to take 
into account possible q_'..lality changes in the four products. 
It should be noted that the contributions of each of the four crops to the 
increase in BCST exports between J.957-58-59 and 1967-68-69 was quite different 
from their participation i!l total e:q,orts during 1957 through 1969,, Their contribu­





take place in commoditie~ whose prices are negatively correlated; at least 
Colombia has moved into othe:.c primary products which don't systematically 
follow the gyrations of coffee marltets. 
For BCST, exports re}?resent 911 important outlet for domestic production, 
yet those exports account for a Yery small share in total world exports of 
those commodities. The following tabulation shows those relations circa 
1965-69:2 
Exports as %of 
Domestic Production 
Colombian Exports as 










Tobacco 26.9 1.2 
The share of production exported every year has fluctuated oonsiderabl.Y, 
particularly for cotton and sugar. As supplying the local market receives 
first priority, exports bear the brunt of poor crops (which have triggered 
export prohibitions in some cases) and become the key outlet for bountif'ul. 
ones. In the case of bananas, output has been particularly vulnerable to 
pests and hurricanes, but the other three crops also show the fluctuations 
associated with primary production. 
The sr.1all shares which Colombian BCST exports have in world markets 
do not necessarily i~ply very high price elasticities in the foreign demand 
tor those goods. For one thing, bananas, cotton, sugar and tobacco are 
hardly horuogeneous products. (Colombian tobacco is far from a perfect substitute 
for the Cuban J.eaf, for example. ) Secondly, "the world market" is a fragmented 
one, and exports to -:ountry A mey not be substituted by exports to country B. 
The clea.res·~ example of this :'..s the sugar ma:·ket, in which Colombia is 
subject to export quot~s gen~rated by the U.S. as well as by the International 
Sugar Ae;rei:ment, end fac~s discriminatory bo.:--riers in European end other co\Ultries, 
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It should also be noted that the Colombian market shares, though small, 
have been tending to grow, and that part of such expansion is due to peculiar 
once-and-for-all events (the blockade against Cuba, for example). Nevertheless, 
while foreign demand ma;y not be perfectly price-elastic for BCST, the small 
Colombian market shares do provide support to the view that during the 
period under study Colombia has faced a rather price-elastic foreign demand 
and that at least for the next few years, given the likely increases in 
Colombian output, there is little ground for nelasticity-pessimism"· regarding 
BCST exports. In circmnstances under which a given commodity bumps one 
year against foreign-imposed (demand) quotas, and the next year is subject 
to export prohibitions and supply quotas, it is difficult to be more precise 
about the shape of the idealized foreign demand schedule. 
One ma;y add that BCST exports are placed almost wholly outside the 
LAFI'A preferential trading bloc, as shown in Table III-2, in sharp contrast 
to the rest of registered minor exports. Therefore, they earn foreign 
exchange which is in an important sense more valuable than that earned 
from expo~s to L.AFTA, under the reasonable assumptions that 11 re~iprocity" 
will be more narrowly enforced within LAFTA, and that such commerce will 
involve some trade-diversion. 
Another characteristic of the BCST group is that, besides receiving 
influences emanating from foreign trade policy, it has been very much the 
subject of special agricultural public policies, which regulate its internal 
prices, provide credit, etc. The case of cotton is perhaps the most dramatic 
example of the pa;y-off to such ad-hoc, crop-specific programs. As shown 
in Table III-5, Colmbia passed fro.~ being a net importer to a net exporter 
Table III-5 
Cotton in Colombia 
(Thousand Metric Tons; Annual Averages) 
Production Imports Exports 
1948-52 8 17 0 
1953-55 25 8 0 
1958-59 50 9 0 
1960-61 73 1 20 
1962-65 71 4 l.8 
1966-69 109 2 35 











of that cornmodity within a short period of time. During the 1950's cotton 
growers (mainly large scale growers, it may be noted) received generous 
credit and price support from an institute designed exclusively to promote 
that crop. Since then, such policies have continued, raising not only 
output, but also yields. Sugar and bananas have also benefitted greatly 
from special public credit programs. 
The production of BCST crops is overwhelmingly in Colombian hands. 
Foreign ownership in the production of bananas existed until a few years 
ago; now the foreign participation is limited to the marketing of that 
product. In cotton, sugar and tobacco both production and marketing, as 
in the case of coffee (but not oil), is almost wholly Colombian. The 
expansion of BCST exports, therefore, can hardly be credited to any special 
foreign presence in producing or selling those commodities. 
The BCST crops are grown at several points well spread out within 
Colombia; for example, sugar comes mainly from the Cauca valley, bananas 
from the gulf of Uraba, while cotton is increasingly ~rmm in the Atlantic 
·coast. 
Manufactured Exports 
Colombian manufactured exports have gone from an annual average of $14 
Million during 1957-58-59 to $73 r!illion during 1967-68-69. That expansion 
accounted for 46 percent of the total growth in reeistered minor exports 
between those two dates. It would be a mistake to assume that all of these 
exports are made up of labor-intensive oo:rra:nodities~ the list includes not 
only cotton textiles, shoes and near-handicrafts, but also fuel-oil, chemicals 
and cement. P~ it will be seen below, some aspects of Colorebian export 
promotion policy ma~y- in fact encourage the latter type more than the former. 
Table III-3 presented a list of manufactured exports, which can be 
expanded for the years 1964 through 1968 as follows: 
Annual Averages ; Pillion U.S. Dollars 
SITC Classification 1967-68 1964-65-66 
3 Petroleum products 14.o 8.5 
5 Chemicals 6.7 5.7 
6.l Leather manufactures 3.0 3.4 
6.29 Rubber manufactures 1.6 2.6 
6.4 Paper manufactures 9.3 2.6 
6.5 Textile manufactures 8.2 9.0 
6.6 Non-metallic manufactures 7.6 3.8 
6.8 Hon-ferrous metals 3.6 l.O 
6.9 Manufactures of metals nes 1.7 1.0 
--Other manufactures classified by 
materials 1.2 1.0 
7 Machinery and transport equipment 3.8 2.7 
8 l1iscellaneous manufactured articles 3.2 2.3 
Total 63.8 
The diversity of Colombia....'1 manu:factured exports should be apparent 
trom these figures. Given this heterogeneity, it is difficult to obtain 
export quantum and unit value indices, as it ,.,as done in the case of BCST. 
A rough analytical classification of all manufactured exports could 
be a.S i vi:i..·Jw;:, . 
(a) Those which involve some slight processing of primary products (These 
are mostly included under SITC categories 0, l, and 2, so they are 
excluded from our definition of ''manufactures,;. Examples are refined 
sugar, oil seed cakes, etc.}. 
(b) Capital-intensive commodities, sold sporadically in competitive world 
markets. These are exports designed to use up planned or unplanned 
excess capacity, sold at marginal cost ( 11 dumping fl), by plants whose 
output is, over the long run, expected to go mainly (say 95~ and above} 
to the local market. Examples a.re exports of some chemicals and 
petroleum products. 
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(c) Capital-intensive commodities, whose plants have been designed to 
sell a good share of their output (say 5 to 30%) within the Latin 
American Free Trade Association, taking advantage of tariff preferences. 
This category is expected to gain in importance. Examples are petro­
chemicals and automobile parts. 
(d) Labor-intensive commodities, or parts of final products, sold at world 
prices. 
This classification, of course, could be further refined. Sporadic 
capital-intensive exports can go to L.A2TA as well as to world markets. 
Labor-intensive CO!!i;.7lodities may be sold from plants totally or partially 
devoted to the export market (the former are still rare). The line between 
:,labor-intensive" ar.d other goods or processes is far from a clear one, 
nor is the line between manufactures and primary products a sharp one. To 
give one example combining both ambiguities: exports of cotton textiles 
( 
11manufactures ;, ) are, in value, about half raw cotton ( 11primary product11 '), 
and it is not clear whether the cotton spinning and weaving is more or 
less labor intensive than 't.t1e growing of cotton. Finally, some exports 
of manufactures are close complements of primary product exports; this is 
the case of the cardboard e>..-ported as banana boxes. Othere, although capital­
intensive, may exploit locational advantages, as in the case of cement 
exports from the Colombian Atlantic coast. 
It is not possible, at this stage, to classify Colombian manufactured 
exports according to the categories outlined above. But the discussion 
at least should alert us to the possibility of policy-induced i!Leontief 
paradoxes rt. In particular, one may put forth the conjecture that manufactured 
exports to LAFTA are likely to be more capital-intensive than those to the 
rest of the world. 
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Colombifu, manufactured exports represent a very small fraction of 
both domestic msnufactured prod11ction, and of world trade in manufactured 
goods. With few exceptions, lo(!al p:i..ants seldom have planned to export, 
as a regular business, mo:::e than 10 percent o:Z their output. Some enterprises 
are cautiously moving into higher ~anges (textiles, for example), and 
there are a handful of small pla...-its which ship ab:coad 100 percent of their 
production (e.g., some leather-processing near--handicrafts, and clothing 
plants located in the Barra11quilia "Jonde.d free trade facilities). There are 
few manufactures for whi.ch Colam')ian export8 have raore than a tiny fraction 
of world trade; nevertheleEs, in textiles Colombia. faces U.S. import quotas, 
and in cement Colombian exports have some influence within the Caribbean 
and Gulf of Mexico markets. On the whole, it appears that Colombia has 
just begun to tap foreign market possibilities for her manufactures, both 
inside and outside the LAFTA region. "Elasticity-pessimism11 seems even 
less justified for manufactures than for BCST exports. 
Comparing Tables III-2 ( fourth column) with total manufactured exports, 
it mey be seen that LAFTA accounted, at most, for 39 percent of Colombian 
manufactured exports during 1965-69. (The actual percentage will be somewhat 
lower, as not all "ninor 'minor11 exports went to non-LAFTA destinations). 
As suggested earlier, LAFTA tal;:es a larger share of Colombian exports such 
as rubber tires, pharmaceuticals, machinery and transport equipment, plastics, 
etc., which appear to be capital- and/or import-intensive (the reason for 
the latter will be seen below). On the other hand, cotton textiles and 
leather manufactures e.re primarily solo. to the rest of the world. During 1969 
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for example, the LAFTA share was as indic~ed in the following types of 
3manuf'actured exports: 
Value of All Exports 
SITC Classification LAFTA Share (Million U.S. dolla.n 
·513 and 514 Inorganic Chemicals 67% $2.63 
541 Medical and Pharmaceutical 
Products 77 3.24 
581 Plastics 95 1.30 
599 Other Chemicals, nes 58 1.25 
612 Leather manufactures, nes 5 0.38 
629 Rubber Products 74 1.02 
631 and 632 Hood Manufactures nil 1.44 
651, 652 and 653 Textiles 15 12.25 
Since around 1956, and first motivated by a desire to use industrial 
excess capacity, the i;nport content of' certain exports, mainly manuf'actured 
goods, has been exempted (ex-ante) frOin import duties, previous deposits, 
consular fees and the need to obt~in previous import licenses, subject to 
some stringent conditions. These now include: the signature of an ad-hoc 
contract with the government specifying clearly the export goods, proof 
that the impo:!'ts are being financed according to I,aw 444, depositing with 
customs a guarantee ( from a bank or an insurance company} amounting to 
twice the corresponding import c.uties, a guarantee that those imports which 
have not been used and are on the prohibited list will be re-exported, 
a commitment to car:r:r a special set of accounting books for these contracts, 
etc. Not surprisingly, the major (but not exclusive) users of this "Plan 
ValleJon, as it is known in Colombia since 1959, have been large_ manufacturing 
firms. More general "drawback 11 (ex-post) systems are also allowed in principle· 
by Law 444 and its predecessors, but have not been implemented in practice, 
with the exception of the :'.Plan Vallejo Jr. 11 or "reposition" provision, 
which since 1964 allows exporters which had used imported inputs and had paid 
duties on them, to import the same q_uantity and q_uality of merchandise 
free of duties, vrevious deposits and of the requirement of obtaining a 
previous license. 
It mEzy" be seen in Table III-6 that a vigorous implementation of the 
11Plan Vallejo" can be dated starting around 1962, after the system was 
reformed in 1959. :Curing recent years (1967 through 1970), 
11Plan Vallejo" 
exports have accounted for about 30 percent of all minor exports, and a 
dominant share of manufactured exports. 
The import content (which includes machinery as well as. raw materials} 
of these exports is substantial, and exceeds the average import content 
4 
of all Colcmbian industry, estimated at around 13 percent. The alert reader 
will have noted that the joint impact of CAT, discussed in Chapter I, plus 
the "Plan Vallejo'1 ca.'1 have not only a significant incentive eff'ect, far 
exceeding the sum of the impacts of each scheme in isolation, but also 
· one biased in favor of import--intensive exports. Take a simple example 
of an activity with an import content of 40 percent. Taking into account 
the true-exempt nature of the CAT, but also its one year discount, but neglectine 
the transaction costs involved in using the "Plan Vallejo", one can estimate 
the "effective protection 11 for exports of that activity as follows: 
1) Assumed world sales price $100 
2) Plus net CAT ( about 18 percent ) 118 
3) Minus world purchases; equals value added at 
domestic prices 78 
604) Value added at world prices 
5) "Effective protection:, 30% 
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Table III-6 
Exports and Imports under 
11Plan Vallejo" 
(Hillion Current US Dollars) 
Imports as % 
Imports Exports of Exports 
1960 0.10 0.06 \
,r 
0.181961 0.20 t43.3 
1962 0.17 o.84 
1963 2.22 5.80 38.3 
1964 5.08 12.87 39-5 
1965 9.83 26.19 37-5 
1966 12.06 41.69 28.9 
1967 16.97 40.79 41.6 
1968 17.86 51.95 34.4 
1969 13.65 62.80 21.7 
1970 26.32 64.58 40.8 
Source: IHCCH-'EX (Instituto Coloooiano de Comercio Exterior), 
11An~isis Sobre el Desarrollo de los Sistemas Especiales de 
Importacion-Exportaci~", July~ 1971. Imports include both 
raw Eaterials and machinery. 
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This 11 effective protection:i of 30 percent may be compared with that 
which would result if neither CAT nor Plan Vallejo existed, and if the 
average domestic price for imported inputs were raised by import restrictions 
In that case, the ''effective30 percent above the world market price. 
protection° would be ~inus 20 percent, or a swing of 50 percentage points. 
Clearly, activities with lower import components will receive lower 
11effective 
protection11 for their exports, and their swing would be less, ceteris 
paribus. 
Whether the effective protection applicable to manufactured exports 
is higher or lower than those which can be calculated for the share of the 
output which these activities sell in the domestic market will, of course, 
depend on the corresponding domestic prices for output and inputs (both 
reflecting import restrictions without exemptions). 
Table III-7 presents some (partial) estimates of the differential 
incentives given for a sample of 105 manufactured products, depending on 
whether they a.re sold within Colombia or exported, and on whether·the 
-side, however, these, estimates only consider tariffs, assuming that they 
equal the difference between domestic and foreign prices. This is, of 
course, not true for many products, either because the tariff contains 
"water11 , or because of import controls. So the Table serves primarily 
to illustrate (very rough) orders of magnitude for the differences among 
columns for the same product, rather than differences in treatment among 
products in the same column. '!'he third colum.."'1 .takes into account the CAT, 




Effective Protection Yielded by Tariffs and Export Promotion Schemes, 
circa 1970? for 105 Products 
(Percentages) 
For Exports, For Exports, 
without with 
For Sales Promotion Promotion 
in Colombia Schemes Schemes 
Foodstuffs, tobacco and beverages (8) 198 -91 43 
Textiles (5) 267 -34 43 
Clothing (7) 387 -52 40 
Wood and wood products (6) 120 -71 38 
Paper and paper products (7) 133 -67. 47 
Printing and publishing (3) 79 - 7 27 
Leather and leather products (6) 203 -149 58 
Rubber and rubber products (2) 59 -36 47 
Chemicals and petrochemicals (14) 49 -27 37 
Stone, earth and clay products (7) 97 - 9 25 
Metals and metal products (19) 101 -39 40 
Non-electrical tools and machinery (6) 33 -17 27 
Electrical produets and machinery (4) 57 -52 52 
Transport equipment (6) 59 -30 38 
Others. (5) 149 -48 42 
Total (105) -48 39 
Sources and method: Data summarized from unpublished calculations of Mr. Gonzalo 
Giraldo, of the Planning Department of Colombia. The sample of 105 manufactured 
products vas selected as actual or potential exports within the Andean Common 
Market, of which Colombia is a member. In the calculation of effective protection 
only tariffs and export promotion schemes were taken into account (see text}. 
Input coefficients actually observed in Colombia were used; imports of capital goods 
were excluded. A net CA'I of 20% was assumed, a figure which may be regarded as a 
bit high. Special regimes exempting some imports of duties were neglected for 
this calculation. 
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It may be seen that while the export promotion schemes have not 
equalized the tariff-intended "effective :protection" between exports and 
domestic sales, they have narrowed the gap relative to a stiuation withou
t 
Indeed, in the sample of 105 products, thereexport promotion schemes. 
were 18 of them for which the last column was higher than the first. The
 
table again shows that the combined effect of a CAT based on sales -value, 
plus exemption of duties on imported inputs can be quite powerful, in 
many cases clearly offsetting the negative effect of peso overvaluation o
n 
the peso prices of exports relative to home goods, even when those prices
 
remain unfavorable compared with those of import competing goods. 
5 
does discriminateAlthough the combined effect of CAT plus i!Plan Vallejo
11 
among activities, the spread of the third column is smaller than that of 
the first. This indicates that variations in tariffs on outputs (and/or 
on finished products) is greater than those on inputs. 
can reach extraordinaryThe incentive effects of CAT plus "Plan Vallejo
11 
levels, quite possibly detrimental to the Colombian economy, in the case 
This can be shown going back to the simple exampleof exports to LAFTA. 
presented earlier. Suppose, in addition to the assumptions already made,
 
that Colombian exports placed within LAFTA are sold at prices 50 percent 
above world prices. The calculation of "effective protection", inclusive 
of LAFTA margins, would now be as follows : 
1) Assumed LAFTA price $150 
2) Plus net CAT (18 percent) 177 
3) Minus world purche.ses; equals value added at 
Colombian prices 137 
604) Value adc.ed at world prices 
5) "Effective protection
11 
, including LAFTA 128% 
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In other words, if LAFTA protective margins e.re similar to those 
Colanbia applies vis-a-vis the rest of the (non-LAFTA) world, Colombian 
producers mizy actually prefer to sell to LAFTA rather than to the danestic 
market, as the CAT-Plan Vallejo benefits could easily outweigh transport 
costs. 
It should be emphasized at this point that not all "Plan Vallejo" 
exports go to LAFTA ( and that not all "Plan Vallejo" exports involve 
manufactured goods ) • During 1967 through 1969, in :fact, only 23 percent 
of ''Plan Vallejo" exports went to LAFTA, amounting to less than 8 percent 
of all registered minor exports. The possibility of severe distortions 
in this area., however, bears watching. 
As in the case of BCST exports, there are a number of policy instruments 
not directly linked with :foreign trade which have been manipulated to stimulate 
and coax manufactured exports, including credit policy, and price controls. 
These will be discussed in another section. 
The exact degree of participation of direct foreign investment 
in Colombian manu!'actured exports is not now known. Two great Colombian­
owned corporations ( COLTEJER and FABRICATO) dominate textile exports, and 
it appears that most firms exporting leather products are also Colombian 
owned. Foreign participation looms larger in chemicals, glass, rubber tires 
and paper. As of 1971, for~ign-owned assembly-type operations hooked onto 
multinational busi.ne;;;ses were rare. On the whole, the expansion of Colombian 
manufactured exports appears to owe 11ttle so far to the specific talents 
of export-oriented foreign investors. 
As in the case of BCST crops, ma..."lufactured exports come f"rom several 
points within Colombia. The geographical advantages of the Atlantic coast 
cities of Cartagena and Barranquilla, however, may make them dominant ex­
porting centers if exporting continues to grow in importance in the planning 
of new industrial plants. 
Minor/Minor Exports 
Besides manufactured and BCST exports there is a residual category, made 
up mainly of primary products. It contains i terns, such as flowers, meat 
end lumber, with a remarkable growth potential, due to a combination of 
tavorabil:.e world markets and a fairly elastic domestic supply. In some cases, 
as with meat and cattle on the hoof, border trade, or non-registered exports, 
have been important for raany years. The diversified Colombian geography 
seems capable of generating a generous supply of a wide variety of these 
minor/minor exports, from live tropical fish and precious stones, to less 
«ot:tc beans and shri::np, for which the Colombian share in world markets 
remains small. As a whole, this type of export appears to be Colombian-owned, 
small scale and relatively labor-intensive. 
A Closer· Look o.t the ◊J.stomers for Colombian Exoorts 
Besides the appearance of LAFTA, and of its sub-region, the Andean 
Common Market, there have been other significant changes during the 1960's 
in the importance of the different customers for Colombian exports. The 
United States share in all registered Colombian exports dropped from 
70 percent during 1957-58 to 40 percent during 1967-68-69, while that tor 
from 13 to 24 percent betweenthe (unenlarged) European Common Market rose 
the· same years. The absolute average annual dollar value of Colombian exporta 
to the U.S., in fact, declined by a remarkable one-third between 1957-58 and 
1967-68-69. The LAFTA share in all exports, in spite of e. registered increase 





GeograEhical Distribution of Colombian Exports 
(Porcentages of Total Registered Exports 
in each commodity category) 
1967-68-69 1957-58 
Non-BCST Non-BCST 
Coffee Oil BCST Minor Coffee Oil BCST Minor 
United States 44.4 54.9 17.2 35. 4 81.1 40. 7 8.7 31.4 
Canada l.3 nil o.6 3.l l.8 nil nil 0.5 
United Kingdom 0.1 9.6 15.4 1.5 0.2 6.0 nil 13.9 
Japan l.5 nil 3.9 1.6 0.2 nil nil 0.1 
European Common Market 27.9 1.4 43.6 9.0 11.3 4.3 75.0 1.1 
Other Industrial We stern 
Europe 6.9 nil 4.8 3.7 3.4 0.2 14.4 0.2 
Other Non-Soviet Europe 10.5 2.6 5. l 1.1 1.6 nil nil 0.1 
Andean Common Market nil 8.5 2.7 16.7 nil 0.2 nil 13.9 
Other LAFTA 1.1 nil l.4 10.0 nil l.O nil 9.9 
Central Jlmericen Co!!lI!lon Market nil nil nil 4.2 nil -nil 0.1 6.1 
Other Western Hemisphere nil 23.0 0.1 12.5 nil 47.7 nil 16.9 
Soviet Area8 5.5 nil 3.2 0.1 0.3 nil. 0.1 nil 
Others 0.2 m.. l 1.5 l.3 0.2 nil 1.7 nil 
Sources and Method: IMF-DOT, several is;mes, The groupings of countries were slightly 
altered f.com the standard IMF-DQT catc".gc,ries. 
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The increasea_ geographical diversification of Colombian exports has 
come about not only as a result of greater product diversification. It 
may be seen in Table III-8 that a marked diversification in markets for 
coffee occurred between 1957-58 and 1967-68-69, with the U.S. losing almost 
half of its still dominant share. A similar trend has been registered 
for BCST exports, vd.th the European Common Market losing a large chunk of 
its leading share. In spite of large increases in their absolute level, 
the geographical spread in non-BCST minor e~--ports changed surprisingly little 
between the two periods shown. Both the U.S. and the 'W'TJ.. shares_ rose, but 
not by much. European and Japanese mru-kets for these non-i;raditional exports 
have remained on the whole flabby relative to their purchases of more 
traditional primary products (coffee and BCST). 
These trends come out more clearly in Table III-9, which focuses on 
geographical shares of tae net increments of annual exports between 1957-58 
and 1967-68-69. Besides the changes already noted for all exports, the 
growing importa.TJ.ce of the markets in no~her non-Soviet Europe" (with Spain 
-- .&.'-- '·-·· _____ .._ __ , --..:1 _z_ 
n.:, ••••~ 1·1111111.r·;y;n-3 a.LJ.U. ..LU In both 
tbe major export is coffee, scld under bilateral arrangements. Those 
arrangements, steadily but mildly criticized by the n1F, as well as by others, 
together with the LAFTA (and Andean) pacts, represented the major Colombian 
departures from ~ultilateral rules of the game for trade. The bilateral 
pacts, of course, also limited the convertibility of export proceeds. By 
1971 bilateral payments agree~ents had dwindled to those with the Democratic 
Republic of Germany, Hunguy, Poland, Spe.in, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. 
In 1958 t':lere we:-e 9.cditional bilateral F_greements with Denmark, Ecuador, 
Finland, Franc~ and C::-.echoslovakia. 
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Table III-9 
"Geographical Distribution of the Increment in the Average Annual Dollar Value 
of E:cPorts between 1957-58 and 1967-68-69 
(Pc~centages of Total Increment in Each Commodity Category) 
All Registered All Registered Non-BCST 
Exports ?fl.nor Exports BCST Registered
Minor Exports 
United States -155.4 31.0 21.6 36.3 
Canada 1.8 2.7 0.9 3.7 
United Kingdom 15.9 7.5 23.4 -1.6 
lapan 11.7 3.4 5.8 2.09.4European Common Market 96.9 16.0 27.5 
other Industrial Western 
Europe 19.3 2.9 ' -0.l 4.6 
,-Other Non-Soviet Europe 49.2 3.6 7.7 1.3 
.Andean Common Market 27.5 12.5 4.o 17.4 
Other LAFTA 16.4 7.1 2.2 10.0 
Central .AI:lP.rican Common
Market 4.1 2.4 -0.1 3.8 
Other Weatern Hemisphere -17.4 7.6 1.1 u.4 
Soviet fu.~e;).S 27.7 1.8 4.7 0.2 
Others 2.4 1.5 1.4 1.6 
Sources end Method: Basic data as in Table III-8. 
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The concentration of the expansion of non-BCST minor exports within 
The share of that increasethe .Americas emerges clearly from Table III-9. 
going to the sheltered LAFTA zone was 27 percent. The Caribbean and 
Central American areas, where Colombia has to meet without :preferences 
competition from the rest of the world, accounted for an additional 
~5 percent. The U.S. and Canada picked up another 40 percent of the 
increase in non-BCST minor exports, leaving only about 17 percent of the 
In contrast with this pattern, theincrement for the rest of the world. 
.Americas absorbed only 30 percent of the expansion of BCST exports. 
Policy Variables: The Het Effective Exchange Rate Applied to Minor Exports
 
We can now turn to an examination of the variables manipulated by 
Colombian authorities in their search for la.-rger minor exports, beginning 
with exchange rate policy. 
Before the exchange reforms of April 1967, "the exchange rate applied 
to minor exportsJ' was often a blurry concept, subject to frequent changes. 
A quantification attempt, which becomes more robust as more recent years 
It involves the basic exchangea.re approached, is presented in Table III-10. 
rate given for most new non-coffee, non-petroleum merchandise exports. 
Frequently during the 1950' s and early 1960 's this rate was not applicable 
to exports of gold, bananas, raw hides, precious stones, etc., nor for 
manufactured exports having more than a given percentage of imported inputs
. 
The rate was a110'wed to flod.t freely during some periods (as during 1959} 
when it coincided with the free rate applicable to most capital account 
At other times, it was pegged at a level different fromtransactions. 
Since June 1968that applicable to coff'ee and imports ( as during 1963). 
it has corresponded to the basic "certificate" exchange rate, which with 
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Table III-10 









































1953-1 3.55 38.7 9.17 























































1957-1 6.34 49.0 12.94 











1958-1 5.92 2 60.0 9.67 
-2 6.10 2 63.0 9.49 
-3 6.10 2 64.o 9.34 
-4 6.10 2 66.o 9.06 
1959-1 7.42 2 66.3 10.96 
-2 8.00 2 69.3 11.31 
-3 7.74 2 70.3 10.80 
-4 6.93 2 71.0 9.56 
1960-1 6.81 2 71.0 9.39 
-2 6.82 2 72.0 9.28 
-3 6.92 2 72.0 9.42 
-4 7.12 2 73.0 9.56 
1961-1 7.55 2 74.3 9.97 
-2 8.23 78.0 10.55 
-3 8.63 14 78.0 12.62 
-4 8.77 14 78.0 12.82 
-----
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Table III-10 continued 
Basic Export Subsidies Index of Iil'et Rea.: 
Rate Taxes Via Tax Colombian Exchar.ise 
(Pesos (%) System Wholesale Ratd Applied 
One U.S. (%) Prices to Most 
$) Deflated Minor Exports 
by those of (1963 Prices) 
-tb:e U.S. 
12.861962-1 8.80 14 78.0
14 79.0 12.86-2 8.91
-3 8.61 14 79.0 12.43 
-4 10.22 14 80.0 14.56 
14 90.0 12.781963-1 10.09
-2 9.99 14 101.0 11.28 
9.99 14 103.0 11.06-3 
14 107 .o 10.64-4 9.99 
112.0 10.171964-1 9.99 14 
-2 9.98 14 119.0 9.56 
-3 9.98 14 119.0 9.56 
-4 11. 74 14 119.0 1L24 
14 118.8 13.021965-1 l3.57
-2 16.63 14 122.6 15.47 
-3 19.03 14 124.3 17.45 
14 132.0 l~_.66-4 13.50 11.301966-1 13.50 14 136.2 
-2 13,50 14 142.9 10.77 
-3 13.50 14 142.5 10. 80 
-4 13.50 14 145.3 10.59 
14 147.5 10.431967-1 13.50
-2 14.02 18 150.l 11.02 
-3 14.86 18 151. 7 11.56 
-4 15.54 18 153-5 11.95 
; c; Ali 18 153.8 12.15...;. . .,,; • v-:-1968=1
-2 16.14 18 157.3 12.11 
-3 16.39 18 15·7. O 12.32 
18 156. '{ 12.60-4 16.73
1969-1 16.96 18 157.1 12.74 
-2 17.19 18 160.0 12.68 
-3 17.45 18 160.9 12. eo 
-4 17.69 18 163.7 12. 75 
18. oo 13 162.8 13.041970-1
-2 18.30 18 167.1 12.92 
-3 18.56 18 166.7 13.14 
-4 18.92 19 169.3 13.30 
1971-1 19.29 19 171.7 13.37 
-2 19.69 19 175.7 13.34 
Sources and M~thod.: Basic rate applied to most minor exports were o~)tained :~rom 
IMF-IFS and IMF-ARO::R, several issu-=s. It should be noted t.hat ~ es.ped aJ ly .:1:uring 
-20c-
·the 1950' s, minor exports we1·e seldom treated as a homogeneous category. Export 
taxes were also obtained from Il-W-AROER. Subsidies via the tax system are 
of: (a) an allowance for income tax deductionsestimates of the average impact 
for exporters, effective from the th±rd quarter of 1961 through the first quarter 
of 1967; and {b) the CAT, granted to all minor exporters from the second quarter 
of 1967 through the present. Both of these subsidies affected companies differently 
depending on their particular tax situation and bracket; an average tax rate 
of 30 percent was assumed to compute the net subsidy. On the other hand, the 
CAT is a negotiable instrument which could be used in lieu of cash to pay taxes 
only one year (reduced to 9 months in October 1970) from issue. Its exact present 
rate of aboutvalue will fluctuate with interest rate changes; an average discount 
18 percent has been assumed. (Under the pre-CAT subsidy scheme there was typically 
one year lag the other way, i.e., between export earnings and tax payments). 
Wholesale pricP.s for Colombia and the U.S. were obtained from the IMF-IFS. 
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minor eY.ceptions (such as petroleum) applies to nearly all current and 
capital account transactions. 
The more notable features of the fiscal system affecting new exporters 
are taken into ar:count by colum;_1s two and three of Table: III-10. The 
emergency measure;,, taken after the overthrow of General Rojas Pinilla in 
1957 included export truces; 15 percent during the third quarter of 1957 
and 2 percent subsequently through the first quarter of 1961 for most 
minor exports. These taxes were justified as part of the austerity package
 
aimed at working cff short term foreign debts accumulated under the previous
 
regime. 
Starting ef~ectively in June 1961, fiscal law (based on Law 81 of 
December 22, 1960) assum.~d that export profits were as much as 40 percent 
of gross exports, and allowed presumed export profits to be deducted from 
other profits. Excluded from the benefits of this law, besides coffee 
Assuming a marginaland petroleum, were bananas, pi·ecious metals and hides. 
income tax of 30 percent, with a normal lag of one year between export 
receipts and tax payment, one obtains an average (taxable-equivalent) 
subsidy of about 14 ;iercent. Mote that the bigger the corporation and, 
presumably, the higher its marginal tax rate, t:ne larger the subsidy. 
Articles 166 througn 171 of Lc.w 444 of Ma:::-ch 22, 1967, repiaced that 
fiscal incentive w::_th t:!.1e neater device of ntax certificates" given to 
exporters of goo~s othe~ ~han coffee, petroleU1!1 and its by-products; and 
raw cattle hides. Those certific.:i.tes (or CAT, using -their Spanish initis.ls
) 
amounted tc 15 percent of t~e f,o.b- value of ex;orts, and could be used 
tc pay ince1"'le, sales a....-1c. i!lJ.pcrt truces. Criginally, tb.ey could be used for 
t.hose purpose:3 at face ,,alue only one yef.X after they were issued, but 
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Table III-11 
Four Features of the Net Real Exchange Rate for Minor Exports 
.Annual Year-to- Index of Level Relative 
Levels Year Instability to Average Import 
(Pesos Changes (Percentages) Exchange Rate 
per One (Percentages) 
us$) 
1953 8.66 10.2 na 1.39 































1961 J.1.49 22.1 7.83 1.32 
1962 13.18 14.7 5.20 1.52 



























1969 12.74 J.6 0.73 1.19 
1970 13.10 2.8 1.53 1.19 
Sources and Method: Basic data o·otained from the last column of Table III-10 
8lld from the sources listed there; the average import exchange rate {quarterly) 
we.s obtained from IMF-IFS. See text for explanations of the third and fotL. :-h 
columns. 
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. the owner could sell them freely to others, at the discount indicated by 
short term interest rates. CATs themselves are tax exempt. While under 
previous tax exemption one had to have a given level of profits from 
other activities before one could benefit from the system, CATs can be 
readily converted into cash by any exporter, regardless of his tax status. 
than offsets their discount,On baJ.ance, the tax exempt status of' CATs more 
yielding an average taxable-equivalent subsidy of about 18 or 19 percent 
(more details on these calculations are found in the notes t6 Table III-10).
6 
Once account is taken of differential price trends in Colombia vis-~-vis 
"the rest of the world", one can estimate the net real exchange rate applied 
to most minor exports. Many price indices could be used for this purpose, 
including those within and outside Colombia, and further refinements could 
include bhc.nges in foreign exchange rates. The calculations sh01m in 
Table III-lo simply '.!e,mpare Colombian and U.S. wholesale prices, a method 
which, although rough, probably provides a fairly accurate picture of 
the major trends in the net real exchange rate. 
Four feat~es of the cowruted net real exchange rate ~or miner exports 
may be briefly considered: average annuaJ. levels, year-to-year changes, 
a more refined inclex of i ".lstability, and the gap between the minor export 
rate and the average exchange rate for merchandise imports. It mEey" be 
in the first column cf Table III-11 that recent net exchange ratesseen 
for minor exports exceed those ruling during the 1950' s. The upward 
can be seentrend, however, was far from steady until recent years, as 
in the second and third columns. The unstability measure presented in 
the latter column uses the average of the absolute value of quarter-to­
quarter perce~tage changes, for the four consecutive quarters of a give'n year. 
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Thus, this column shows that during 1954 the quarte
r-to-quarter changes 
in the exchange rate, whether positive or negative,
 averaged 2.9 percent, 
while during 1957 that average rose to a remarkable
 17.7 percent. Besides· 
One of the
1957, other particularly unstable years were 1959 and 1
965. 
key advantages of the crro,ling peg emerges clearly 
from this index for 
1968-q.O (and, one could add, those for 1971-72). 
The last column of Table III-11 presents the ratio 
of the annual 
minor export rate to the average merchandise import
 rate. The latter 
excludes the impact of duties, quotas, etc., on the
 effective cost of 
importing; it is simply an exchange rate, and as su
ch conceptually different 
f'rom the more complicated net effective rate for m
inor eX[)orts to which 
it is compared. For example, the gap shm-m for 196
8-70 arises solely 
Nevertheless, this lastfrom the inclusion of CAT in the export rate. 
periods of exchange reformcolumn serves to highlight one striking fact: 
in Colombia, such as 1957-58, 1963 (more precisely,
 late 1962) and 1966 
(also starting in late 1965) witnessed: (a) increas
es in the real average 
i.mpor-t rate, (b) declines in that corresponding to 
minor exports, and, 
therefore, (c) a tendency toward unification of tho
se two rates. In 
other words, the goal of exchange rate unification 
was pursued even at 
With the exception of thethe expense of incentives for minor exports. 
peculiar circumstances of 1958, however, the minor 
export rate remained 
above that for imports. 
Other Policy Variables Used to Stimulate Hiner Expo
rts 
Earlier sections have already not~d other direct an
d indirect Colombian 
export-promotir..r, policies, i. e, the ;
1Plan Vallejoi;, participation in L.AFTA 
and the .Andean ~roup, plus ad-hoc rural credit and 
othe·r agricultural 
measures. Law 444 of 1967 created other export-promotion schemes, centered 
around a. fund (PROEXPO) , generously financed by a one-and-a-half percent 
tax on the cif. value of all imports. The law (articles 181 through 202) 
gave that fu,nd broad powers and great flexibility to engage in export 
pranotion. PROEXPO provides local producers with information on :foreign 
markets, with technical advice on transport, packing, quality control, etc., 
as well as on production of exportable goods. In. a country where ashortage 
of working capitaln is a pennanent entrepreneurial complaint, it channels 
credit under generous terms to exporting firms, and under special circum­
stances it can provide equity capital. It also insures against political 
and other non-commercial export risks, and has helped to prepare a four­
year export plan. By means of imaginative domestic advertising (including 
billboards proclaiming that 
11 Exporting is the best business in Colombia.") 
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it tries to develop an 'export mentality. Abroad PROEXPO also advertises, 
holds :fairs (even sending a Navy ship with Colombian goods around the 
Caribbean), etc. During 1970, its credit activities amounted to 409 Million 
Colombian pesos plus 6.8 Million U.S. dollars. 
It is difficult to measure the effect of something like PROEXPO 
on non-traditional Colombian exports. Some of its activities, in particular 
its credit operations, are enthusiastically praised by entrepreneurs 
Others, such as its advertisingotherwise starYed for cheap working capital. 
end fairs, have a less clear net value (and can easily degenerate into 
boondoggles). Even less clear and unquantifiable is the value of such an 
institution in affecting private expectations regarding the firmness of 
government commit~ent to supporting export activities. 
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The PROEXPO crecit program is one example of how Colombian authorities 
have used domestic distortions to give greater leverage to export-promoting 
schemes; if Colombian capital markets were perfect, there would be little 
power in that program. Similarly, the potency of the :'Plan Vallejoi: would 
disappear if all non-exchange rate import restrictions were eliminated. 
Note that these measures not always serve to simply offset the harmful 
effects of other policies on exporting; for some firms they may offer a 
net gain relative to an idealized pure neoclassical situation. 
Especially since 1967, in fact, the many instruments of the Colombian 
government have been increasingly tilted in favor of (non-coffee, non-oil) 
exporters. Credit, besides that forthco:m.-tng from PROEXPO and that aimed 
at specific exportable crops, is channelled preferentially, under the more 
or less explicit tutelage of Central 3ank authorities, toward exporters. 
That bias includes not only short ter:n but also long term credit provided 
by several special develop~ent ftL.~ds. Entrepreneurs are both formally 
notified and informally signalled that the fate of t:':leir requests regarding 
import licenses, relee.se frc..'!l price controls, or of any other request ha~ring 
to do with any field where public sector action is importa'lt {and there 
are few where that action is not) will very much depend on their export 
record•. The meda~s and banners regularly presented by the President 
of the Republic to distinguished exporters, in other words, are not simply 
some muscle when dealing withmoral incentives, a.s they eive recipients 
the numerous public agencies capable of making the life of businessmen 
either miserable or easy (and profitable or unprofitable). 
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Finally, there are other export-promoting ideas which are just beginning 
to be exploited in Colombia to an important degree. One is the creation of 
areas within the country with adequate export and overhead facilities into 
which imports can be brought in free of duties and of other import restrictions, 
to be used exclusively by exporting firms located in those areas. At the 
moment there are two such 1'Zonas Fra."'lcas": one in Barranquilla and a more 
recent one in Cali. Trading houses, particularly useful for marketing 
exports from small and medium scale producers, were rare until a few years 
ego, but recently several private (but not public) ones have sprung up. 
The Supply Response of Colombian Minor ExPorts 
On the whole, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the observed time 
series for minor exports trace out mainly movements along or shifts in the 
Colombian supply of exports. World demand for those exports changed and 
shifted throughout the period under study, but there are few products for which 
it could be doubted, in any one year, that it remained not far from perfect 
price-elasticity, in the range relevant for Colombia. Nevertheless, there 
are serious problems in the estimation of the exact suppiy schedule for minor 
exports. 
There are, first of all, the difficulties arising from the heterogeneity 
of those exports. As it was already discussed, it has not been possible to 
obtain quantum indices for all time series. It has also been noted that 
during parts of the period U."'lder study several commodities faced special, 
§JU generis tree.tment, such as bananas, gold and emeralds. Another set of 
problems arise from the many export-promotion policies adopted by Colombia, 
many difficult to quantify, and from their collinearity. 
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Related problems arise in the handling of trends during the 1960 1 s 
which are said to have encouraged the growth of minor exports, such as 
the rapid growth of world trade, and, more relevantly, the creation of 
L.AFrA. Access to a preferential trading arrangement may be viewed as 
providing the possibility of selling exports at higher then world market 
prices to one's partners, in exchange, of course, for buying their exports 
also at higher than world market prices. The LAFTA arrangement then falls 
into the previous difficulty of lack of 11 truen q_uantum indices for most 
minor exports. 
Disaggregation, by :product and customer, seems to provide a partial answer 
to these complications. However, it also introduces other problems. Any 
sub-category of Colombian minor exports is likely to be q_uite thin during 
/ 
most of the period under study, and thus subject to apparently erratic behavior 
as a result of particular events, independent of general policy variables. 
Temporary excess capacity in three or four important plants, for example, 
could give ma~ufactured exports a boost, while a poor cotton crop can send 
the quantum of those exports way down. 
Whatever the exchange rate and export incentives may be, it can normally 
be expected that as a country's productive capacity expands, its supply exports 
will steadily shift to the right. There is thus a case, not based on the 
expansion of world demand, :for including a trend term in regressions trying 
to explain export supply response. But this procedure, given the strong 
upward trend of mino:?." exports and of key policy variables, although yielding 
high R~'s, often results in ambiguous coefficients. 
8 .
Given collinearity and serial correlation problems, it was decided to 




Results of Regressions Explaining Ch_anges in riinor Exports: Annual Data 
(Figures in parentheses under the coefficients show t-ratios) 
Independent Variables 
Dependent Constant Cha11ge Instability Lagged Change R2 F-test DW 
Variables in the of Exchange Change in Dollar 
Exchange Rate in BCST Unit Value 
Rate Ou~ of BCS'I 
I. 1954-70 
1. Total Registered 21.49 0.87 -1.95 o.41 4.9 2.0 
Minor Exports (3.4) (3.0) (2.3) 
2. Total Registered 11. ·78 0.89 -1.25 0.57 0.52 4.7 2.2 
Minor Exports (1.4) (3.3) (1.4) (1. 7) 
3. Value of BCST 22.65 0.98 -1.85 --- 0.20 1.8 2.2 
(2.0) (1.9) (1.2) 
4. Value of BCST -li.63 1.05 0.12 1.60 0.55 5.4 2.4 
{o.4) (2.6) (0.1) (3.2) 
5. Value of Hon-
BCST Minor 27.90 0.74 -2. 45 0.28 2.7 1.9 
Export::; (3.3) (1.9) (2.1) 
II. 1958-G9 
6. 'I'otc:J. Resittcred 2.41' o.48 o.46 0.85 0.57 3.6 2.2 
Mino1· E.'\.-port:; (0.2) (1.6) (0.4) (2.4) 
7. Total Registered 5.55 0.26 0.78 0.61 0.53 0.71 4.2 2.5 
Minor Exports (0.6) (0.9) (0.7) (1.8) (1.8) 
8. Value of BCST -24.57 0.54 2.25 2.41 0.81 11.1 2.3 
(1.9} (1.4) (1. >+) (5.2) 
9. Valu'= of BCST -21.62 0.34 2.55 2.18 0.50 o.84 9.0 2.3 
{l.7) (o.8) (1.6) {4.4) {1.2) 
10. Qumrtwn 0f BCST -2.9 •.79 0.13 3.01 l.95 0.74 7.6 1.8 
(1.7) (0.4) {2.0) (4.6) 
11. Quant·cl!Il of BCST -22.74 0,34 2.71 2.18 -0.50 0.79 6.5 2.2 
(2.0) (0.9) (1.9) (4~8) (1.3) 
12. Value of Non-
BCST Minor 20.03 0.21 -0.09 0.03 0.2 2.0 
·Expo1·i:;.z (1.9) (0.4) {0.1) 
Table III-12 {continued) 
Sources and Method: AE. explained in the text. 
Regressions in Section I of this 
table have 17 observations; those in Section II
 have 12 observations. The change 
in value of BCST and non-BCS~r exports for 1970 w
as estimated from preliminary ex­
Other basic data were obtained from earlier tab
les
change surrender data (BdlR). 
in this chapter. All changes refer to ye1::,r-to-
year percentage changes. 
related to the net effective exchange rate, to see how far one could go 
with just those variebles, ru1d (b) annua.l percentage· changes of the relevant 
variables. Tables III-12 and III-13 present the best results of that attempt. 
The following discussion will first highlight the results most favorable to 
the hypothesis that ''the ez:change rate matters 11 ; this will be followed by 
an examinat:Lon of failures, including those not shown in those tables, as 
well as of other remaining problems of interpretation. 
In the regressions based on annual data (Table III-12), the dependent 
variables shown include the year-to-year percentage changes in the value of 
all minor exports, in the value of BCST and non-BCST exports , and in the 
quantum index of BCST exports. Two time periods are considered. The independent 
variables are the year-to-year change in the net real exchange rate for minor 
exports, as derived in Tables III-10 and III-11, as well as the index of 
instability of that exchange rate, discussed earlier and presented in Table III-11. 
Finally, the lagged year-to-year percentage change in the domestic output 
of BCST crops and the changes in the dollar unit value for BCST exports are 
also included in some regressions. The simple average values ior these ~GI!a~!e~ 
are as follows (all in terms of annual percentage chane;es, except for the 
instability index): 
1954 through 1970 1958 through 1969 
All registered minor exports 12.5 14.6 
Value of BC3'l' e~::ports 14.7 12.6 
Value of non-BCST minor exports 15.4 20.2 
Quantum of BCST exports 16.4 
Excnange rate 3.6 3.4 
Instability index 6.2 5.9 
Output of BCS'r (lagged) 9.2 . 9.1 
Dollar unit value of BCST exports -3-9 
-28a-
Tabie III-13 
Results of Regressions Explainin,:; Changes in Minor Exports: Quarterly Data 














Sources and Method: 
from the IMF-IFS. 
DeEendent Variable: Changes in All Registered Minor Exports 
1954-1/ 1954-1/ 1963-1/ 1963-1/ 1958-1/ 
1971-2 1962-4 . 1971-2 1971-2 1971-2 
23.59 34.28 16.94 169. 81 20.45 
(4.2) (3.9) (2.2) (2.3) (3.3) 
o.86 0.78 0.78 1.54 0.72 
(4.9) (2.9) ( 3.2) (3.5) ( 3. 7) 
-1.61 -3.34 -0.18 -0.32 -1.23 
(2.3) (3.3) (0.2) (0.3) (1.6) 
-12.70 
(2.1) 
0.31 o.46 0.25 0.34 0.24 
15.l 13.8 5.2 5.3 7.9 
1.36 l.36 l.37 l.54 l.36 
70 36 34 34 54 
As· explained in text. Quarterly data on minor exports obtained 
It may be noted fro~ these figures that for the exchange rate to explain 
all of the increase in minor exports one ~-rould want an elasticity of about 
93. 5 or more . 
Regressions 1 throueh 5 in Table III-12 show significant coefficients 
for the excha.11ge rate impl._ving elasticities between 0.74 and 1.05; these 
results are quite similar to those obtained by other researchers. Two of 
these equations also indicate that exchanr,e instability is quite harmful to 
minor exports) thus providinc some support for a 1dd.espread 11hunch"
1 In• 
equation 1, for example, the coefficient for instability tells us that a 
reduction in the averae;e quarterly fluctuations in the exchange rate from 10.0 
to 5.0 will~ ceteris paribus, raise the growth trend of minor exports from 
2 percent per annum to nearly 12 percent; the same result could be obtained, 
again accord:.ng to regression 1, only uith an 11 :percent devaluation in the 
real net exchange rate every year! One may finally note that although the R
2s 
for equations 1 through 5 are not as large as those using untransformed 
variables coupled with time trends, these equations avoid the serial correlation 
:problems plag11; ng the other irersion of supply schedules. 
These results are basically confirmed by those presented in Ta~le III-13, 
based on quarterly data, although usine: again annual percentaee chanBes in 
all minor exports and in the exchange rate as variables. It has not been 
possible to disaggreiate quarterly minor exports. For those ~wo variables, for 
example, the percent age change bet1,een this year's first quarter and last year's 
first quarter, and so on, were used in the recressions. This approach avoids 
seasonality considerations. ~'he index of instability is defined as before; 
for a given quarterly observation t~e i~dex refers to the average fluctuation 
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in the exchange rate during that quarter and during the previous three quarters. 
The hypothesis that the change in minor exports depends not only on changes 
in the exchcnge rate nnd its instability, but 1:..l.so on the level of the ex­
change rate was e.J..."l)lor-ed; the only remotely successful result is presented 
in Table III-13. The avera6 e values for the variables used in those regressions 
are as follows: 
All Registered Exchange Rate Stability Exchange 
Mino:c Exports, .Annual Percentage Index Rate 
Annual Percentage Changes Level 
Changes (Pesos per 
us 4) 
1954-1 through 1971-2 17.5 4.3 6.1 11.l 
1954-1 through 1962-4 17.4 6.3 6.5 10.2 
1963-1 through 1971-2 17.6 2.2 5.6 12.1 
1958-l through 1971-2 15.9 4.1 6.1 11.6 
The estimated supp:.y elasticities with respect to the exchange rate, with 
one exce:p",.,ie,n, ::'.!"-:! qu:: t2 clc:::c to those obtained in the annual regressions. 
Those elasticities are not significa..'1.tly different as between the different 
time periods, and all have hefty t-statistics. The instability index again 
performs re3.5onab.ly ,,el.l, although bette:.~ for the earlier years. The inclusion 
of the level togethe:::- ·rith the chaz,ge of the exchange rate improves the :fit 
tor the 1963 through :971 pe~iod, and about doubles the estimated elasticity. 
Taken lite:..·9.1.1.y, however, this :fotu·th co:.umn indicates that an increase in 
the exchange ra"..;e i :·om 12 pP-s<"'s to :.3.2 pesos {or by 10 percent.) will increase 
minor exports, ~et~_.:e_arir.us, by :!..5.4 percent that year, but will reduce 
the trend growth fro:r, 17.4 p-~rcent to 2.2 percent, so that even during the 
10first post•-deva:!.uation year there will b~ hardly an increase in exports. 
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Another independent variable, not shown, was also added to the 
regressions in Table III-13: the percentage change in the exchange rate 
squared, but keeping its original sign. 1he best results were obtained in 
the regression covering 1963-1 through 1971-2; as expected, this procadure 
increased the coefficient for the bhange in the exchange rate, to 1.71 (with 
a t-ratio of 2. 8), and resulted in a negative sign for the squared term, 
., 2 
which had a coefficient of -0.017, and a t--ratio of 1.6. The R and the 
Durbin Watson statistic rose (slightly) to O. 31 and l. 50, respectively, 
and the stability co2fficient remained insignificant. In all other regressions 
the t-statistic for the squared term was below or.e. One can interpret the 
result for 1963-71 as yielding an upper estimate for the supply elasticity 
of minor exports with respect to the exchange rate; that higher value arises 
once it is recognized that large cha.~ges in the exchange rate cannot be 
expected to yield correspondingly large c...½anges in minor exports, either 
because of adjustment lags or for other reasons. 
Direct experimentation with lagged values for exchange rates, using 
still quarterly data, yielded clearly positive results only in one case. 
For the period 1954-1 through 1962-4, changes in the exchange rate lagged 
one f'ull year had a coefficient of 0.78, with at-statistic of 3.0. The 
unlagged exchange rate change increased its coefficient to 0.~9, with a 
t-statistic of 3.9. The corresponding figures for the stability index were 
2-4.0l (coefficient) and 4.2 Ct-statistic). The R rose to 0.57 and the 
Durbin Watson statistic to 1.50. Note that the sum of the two exchange 
rate coefficients gives a long term elasticity practically identical to that 
obtained for 19-$3-71 when the squared exchanee rate change was included in 
that regression. 
-32-
The evidence discussed so far is consistent with the hypothesis that 
exchange rate policy, including its stability, influenced minor exports a 
good deal. It does not, however, support the :_oresumption that it is the 
only policy which has mattered. Hate how in regressions 1, 3 and 5 of 
Table III-12, and in those of Table III-13, the constant (trend) terms are 
large and significant. Regression l in Table III-12, for example, sa;ys 
that a. constant, perfectly stable real effective exchange ra.te for minor 
exports, at a level similar to that observed during the period under study, 
would be consistent with a growth in those exports of 21.5 percent per annun, 
far exceeding growth in the rest of the Colombian economy. With the instability 
observed, on the average, during 1954 through 1970, the upward trend would 
still be 9.4 percent per annum. An upward creep of 3.6 percent per year in 
the real effective exchange rate, always according to the same regression, 
brings the rate of expansion in minor exports to the 12. 5 percent actually 
observed. What lies behind the powerful constant terms? They could be, 
first of all, picking up inflationary trends in the world economy, but this 
C8""'Lwiot acco~7lt for verf' much, end 1-rculd be limited to non-BCST exports (BCST 
dollar prices have declined on average during the period under study). The 
major answer must rely on other direct and indirect export promotion schemes 
discussed earlier. Note how the constant term drops in regressions 2 and 4 
in Table III-12 when the lagged change in domestic production of BCST is 
brought in; these latt~r changes, as c.iscussed earlier, have been heavily 
influenced by credit and other promotional policies of the public sector 
(and, of course, by weather). 
Unfortunately, the evidence regarding the influence of exchange rate policy 
on minor exports is less robust than it appears at first sight. Disaggregation 
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of annual data, except for regressions 3, 4 and 5 in Table III~l2, and the 
,w;e of only the 1958-69 years (for which BCST export quantum and price indices 
are available), play havoc with our previous conclusions. Even in regressions 2, 
3 and 4 the instability index performs more or less poorly; but in regresamons 
6 through 12 the significance of the exchange rate variable also practically 
disappears. In the latter regression, the instability index even takes on 
an a priori incorrect sign, accompanied by hight-statistics. Only the 
coefficient for the lagged change in local BCST production remains highly 
significant ar..d sensible, yielding an elasticity of' BCST exports with respect 
to output of around two. 
As the dollar prices for BCST exports may be taken as exogenous to 
Colombia, the specification of regressions 10 and ll is superior to that of 
8 and 9 (a...'1.d 3 and 4). Perhaps b~cause of the crttde methodology used in 
deriving the quant'.llll and price inaices, the supply elasticity of the BCST 
export quantum with respect to its own price (i.e., the dollar unit value 
of BCST exports, put in regression 11 separately from the exchange rate) 
yields a c·oefficient w~t'h an incorrect (or unexpected) sign. It may be 
noted that fo:?:" other export commodities it has not been possible to estimate 
supply responses to ;;own" prices, Just to general exchange rate policy. 
Other regressions (not shmm) using changes in dollar values of non-BCST 
exports to LAFTA countries. and non-LAFTA countries separately, as well as 
changes in pure manufe.c-cured exports, as the dependent variables {only for 
1958 through 1969) yielded insignificant coefficients for all variables, excepting 
constant terms. 
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other independent variables, using yearly data, also
 yielded insignificant 
changes in domestic industrial output- (tocoefficients. These included: 
test for the influence of generalized cyclical excess ca
pacity on non-BCST 
and pure manufactured exports) ;11 contemporary (i.e., unlagged) changes in 
the domestic production of BCST; the level of the real e
ffective exchange 
rate, in regressions other than that ',hewn in Table III-13
; and all lagged 
variables excepting BCST output. 
As can be seen in Table III-12, when the years 1954 throu
gh 1957, which 
presumably have the shakier data, are ci.ropped from t
he annual regressions, 
the results worsen C;)nsiderably. It ma,y also be rem
arked that adding 1970 
to the regression for all minor exports worsens the 
fit, as that year witnessed 
a drop in exports difficult to explain with the independ
ent variables at 
hand. 
.Aggregating unregistered with registered minor expor
ts, and using that 
Sil!lUal change as the dependent variable also worsens
 the results, and yields 
Together with the
insignificant coefficients for the independent varia
bles. 
insignificance of most lags, this failure generates some 
suspicion that at 
least part of the apparent exchange rate elasticity 
of registered minor exports 
may arise from substitution effects induced by the l
egal exchange rate (in 
contrast with the blacl: market rate) between smuggli
ng and registration, and 
be_tween one year and another, or one quarter and ano
ther, according to John 
Sheahan's results. Especially before 1967, for exam
ple, the timing of exports 
of storable BCS'.!:' crops could have been influenced by th
e exchange rate, without 
that implyinc; much for the long run expansion of tho
se exports. 
It can be ar~ued with some for~e that the exchange r
ate which has been 
used in the regressions is nore applicable to some m
inor exports than others. 
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It is not just a matter of neglecting ad hoc exchange regulations for some 
products; it is also that for minor exports gain~ to LAFTA one should also 
take into account 1 not the U.S. wholesale price index, but price levels and 
exchange rates in Arge:i.tina, Brazil, Chile, etc. Nevertheless, it remains 
disturbing that the disaggregated results are so mu~h poorer than those for 
all registered minor exports lumped together. 
What to make of this bundle of res~uts? In spite of the shortcomings 
noted, the hypothesis that excha....ge rate policy has be-=n a major influence 
on the evolution of Colombian n:d.r.or exports has more evidence to back it up 
than its extreme opposite. The e..d.dence based on quarterly data is particu­
larly impressive. But it is net possible) given the information available, 
to credit different policy variable£ with exact shares of the increase in those 
exports. The untangling of the impact-of different policies on export promotion 
m9¥ only be possible, ir. fact, using cross-section data for several countries. 
Even then, important interaction effects among export--promotion policies in 
a given country, as well as ·che degree of c1°edibility of those policies among 
entrepreneurs may be ::i.mpossible to q_uentif-,r. .Examples of' this type of issue 
ere the following questions: By how m-..ich :.'..s the credibility of export incentives 
enhanced by the commitrt.-=nt to a cra,vling peg? P.:re there discontinuities 
(or floors and cei.1::.ngs) for the effect.3 oi' some varia½les, depending on the 
value of others? Hill P:10EXPO ef!'o::ts only show if the real net exchange 
rate is above certain mini'llu1n? And will further increases above that minimum 
bring less e:~ports than, sey ~ expc.nding the benef'its of 11PJ.a;.1 Vallejo"? Will 
subsidies to selected industries generate foreign CX'!hange at lower domestic 
resources costs than a n:.ore devalued ex::hange rate? Or avoid generating quasi­
rents? Alas, neither a rriori_ reas~nir..g nor empirical wo1·k appear capable 
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at this point of convincingly answerin6 those questions, at least for Colombia, 
whose experience with substantial minor expo1·ts is, a:rter all, relatively 
short. 
Outlook for Minor _Exports, and. Tho.ir Role in the Colombian Economy 
Whatever its defects, the post-March 1967 policy package has been consistent 
with an acceleration in the growth of minor exports (the average growth rate 
and 18·. 3 percent during 1967 throughwas 12. 3 percent during 1963 through 1966, 
1970). The impact of the g1·eater s•i.:ability 2nd the higher level of the 
effective exchange rate, as well as other P.xpor~-~romoting features of Law 444, 
appear to be sti2..l filte:.cing through the econcI!ly, strengthening the new 
"export mentality' 1 , and triggering fresh lea:-ning effects. If these policies 
are maintained, including the upward creep in the effective exchange rate, 
end if the world econo:ny does not suffer a clremc:.tic trend cr.ange, one can 
expect an average minor export growth ::·ate of still (in spite the larger base) 
about 15 percent dU1·ing the next 10 years. One could add, on the optimistic 
side, that we ?ave onl.y discussed ~~~di~ exports; Colombia has hardly 
begun to explore her potential in export of services, of which tourism is an 
obvious example, an1 which now which no~ does n0t receive CATs. 
Some may find. strange t:hat no further dismantling of the import control 
apparatus has been gi··ren as a Frecondition f('.'r fut·,rre minor export expansion. 
Such dismantling ~ould, of course, serve a.s Ln additi '.)nal impetus, together 
with other policy ch&r.,;es, but Col01ubian P.):';>erience, a::o well as that of other 
countries, shows that :it is not a si~ q~"l .==2!!. fo:i.· e;:port gr01rth. In fact, 
the achievement of th~ 15 percent ta.rre·~ ~-rill ,1.llow th") continuation of the 
gradual relaxation o:' import control!:, ·which ::.as '.:;een going on since 1967. 
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This "virtuous circle;' of export expansion--import liberalization--more 
export growth is, of course, the opposite of the export contraction--import 
controls--fewer export ir.centives trends which dcminated m1:iny Latin American 
economies durin[ about thirty years, following 1929. It should be noted 
that in the triggering of the ''virtuous c:.rcle:1 , export ex!lension, and not 
import liberalizatj_on, is gh-en pride of ple.ce; launching a. massive import 
liberalization progrc:;1 withc,ut a secure export front can lead to serious set­
backs for the whole liberalizaticn P.flort, as the 1965--66 Colombian 
experience shows. Inileed, in :.·et:-ospect such experiments putting the cart 
before the horse, app-=ar as r~.sky "chicken games: 1 designed to force the hand 
of those policy mal,ers reluctant to d~value. November 1966 showed the 
limitations of that tactic. 
Neither is the creation of firms 100 percent devoted to exporting a 
necessary condition for rapid export growth; a gradual increase in the exported 
share of many firms from 5 to lO to 20 percent can give impressive boosts to 
exchange earnings, and even a (constantly rotating) group of sporadic exporters 
What can be questioned is the degree to which a minor export expansion of 
15 percent per year will bl9nefit the Colombian economy,. especially if most 
of that growth were made up of an assortment of capital intensive goods 
subject to possibly distorting incentive schemes, and/or sold under reciprocal 
preferential agreements. r.·re can now turn toward ai., examination of this issue. 
During 1969-70, minor exports acc01.inted for 31 percent for all registered 
exports. If coffee ard petroleum export aollur ~ralues ere held constant, 
a 15 percent annual growth in minor. ezports means that by 1979-80 they will 
have more than d.Jub].ea that sha.re to 61. percent; during th.:it ten yeax interval 
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total export earnings will have grown at mi annual rate of nearly 7 percent. 
In 1969 registered minor exports 1·epresenteil. 3.8 percent of Colombia's Gross 
12 and indirect domestic value added in those exportingDomestic Product ; dire~t 
a~tivities was pr0bably around 3 percent of GDP. Assuming that real danestic 
value added in minor expc-rts gro,rs at 15 :percent per annum, that share will 
have risen to 6_8 percent of GDP bv 1979, :i.f the lat-:.er grcws at 6 percent per 
annum. If GDP expansion rea,;hes 7 perccn.t, the s31Ile figure as for the growth 
of all exports, the snare of" va:':..u<; addea. by minor ex:9orts will be 6. 2 percent 
by 1979. 
The last ·chapter will :::'rov:I de more Jeteiled. speculation on the probable 
role of minor exports i::i furthe:ring Colornb5a1 s develcpment. Here it will 
be sufficient to observe that, give=m the medlocl·~ lc,ng term prospects for 
coffee exports as wel.:!. as :'o:c concP,ssional capita:!. infl0ffs and Co).ombian 
foreign debt obligations, the avv,ilability of capital goods required for 
achieving an average growth rate :::etween 6 and 7 percent per annum during the 
next 10 years will ver-J much depend on achieving a growth in minor exports 
to efficient suppliers of capit.al goods (or to suppliers of freely convertible 
foreign exchange) of about 15 percent per annum. 
What will this scenario imply for the probJem of unemployment and the 
related issue of an skewed j_ncome distribution? It should be clear that the 
achievement of annual growth rates of 15 and 7 percent, for minor exports 
and GDP> respectively, will not necessarily :-esl·.lt in a smaller rate of unemploy­
ment and/or a betteT income dis-~ribution in ten years tim1;;. Remember first 
that the greater availability of ~oreign -,xchange -will allow an expanded 
importation of machinerJ and equ.i.pment; :1ow this en:.arged flow is spread out 
and allocated can make the diffl':!rc::ce :i~-:;...,...e•:!n having a f~w more capital-intensive 
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activities, perhaps labor displacing, or having a large number· of new labor 
absorbing units. unless impo!'t liberalization end other public policies 
consciously 4Yoid giv: ng incentives for the ,~irst type of development, 
faster growth may :0.c~ualJ.y leELd to more un1;;..nployment. 
It has already ·.Jeen noted that se~rera:~ ninor ex_)orts, :;iarticularly 
those going to LAFTA, seem to be quit~ ca_pital ~.ntensive, and also frequently 
import-intensive. 7~1e:.r :.·2.pid expaasion w:1.11 have little impact on the demand 
f'or unsldlled labor; indeed, some purely j_mpo~~t-substituting activities end 
most home goods (non-tradee.1::>les) ace likely to ::.1e lP.ss capital-intensive. 
A gradual :if'ine-tuninga of E-.xport ir.centive s~he:m.es could h2lp correct such 
a situation, by changing t:i.-ie incent~_ve structure without necessarily modifying 
its average level. Steps in this direction covld inc:lude, for example, the 
impositior: of a u.-niform tariff on Plan Vallejo impo0'.'ts, compensated by an 
increase in the CAT fl'lt rate. That CAT increase could also be calculated 
so that it offeets on average the elimination of its te..x-exempt status. Smaller 
firms, and those whose exports have a higher domestic value-added content 
will benefit; both are likely to be relativel.y labo:~-intensive, and involve 
domestic entrepreneurs to a larger degree. The s:pread in the neffective 
13protection'' generated by the export incentives would a.lso be narrowea. The 
application of these reform~, of course, should be carried out with extreme 
care, to avo:i d throwing out the health:ic export growth baby ,-Ti th the only 
slightly dirty (distorted) bath water. Jf nothing else, the state df knowledge 
' 
regarding the exact impe.ct on minor exports of e3.ch of t!1e various promotion 
policies makes such caution very advisable. 
Even with refined and imp1~oved expert promotion and import allocation 
policies it is unlikely that the twin targets of 15 and 7 percent growth for 
minor exports and GDP will improve Colombian income distribution by ver., 
much. Remember that even after ten years value added in minor exports is 
unlikely to exceed 7 pe?cent of GDP, so that even if those exports were all 
labor-intensive, their net impact on the aggregate de.Tfland for lo.bar will 
remain, at least for tb.e next ten years, modest. And further expansion of 
primar., produr.t exports, such as cotton, banana:J ar..d ,::ugar can hardly be 
counted upon to improve lanr'I ttcnur::: cond.itions. In fa.ct, the need to promote 
exports has already bee!: us·::-d as an ~rgll!!le:1.t again.st lane. refo:rm, particularly 
in the Cauca valley. 
The major contribution of :t:'as;e:: exp~.!'.'"t growth end of a foreign trade 
sector free of the periodic crisis so p:,·ev3.len·c befor':! 196r( ·may ver., well 
turn out to be that j t gi~.•es policy md:ers the opr-o:ctun:'..ty, which they may 
or mey not grc1sp, to turn their atten~l.o!, 8.Wd.Y from the basiceJ.ly unnecessar., 
and superficial 0a::i..a::.1ce of pa:rments hys·-eri<'s, a.nd toward more important and 
difficult problems , such us the rai;,ing the 1evel of weli'ar·e of the poorest 
half of the population within a reasoncbly sto:rt r,eriod of time. That task 
will require policy mear:.ures beyona. the ms.nipulation c;,~ exchange rates, tariffs 
and such. 
Footnotes to Chapter III 
* Christina Lanfer did most of the work for this chapter. 
1 The list of those seduced by the hope of explaining the irregular surge 
of Colombian minor experts is impressive. It includes: John Sheahan and 
Sara Clark, "The Response of Colombian Exports to Variations in Effective 
Exchange Rates;;, Research f1emorandum i:fo. 11, Center for Development Economics, 
Williams College, June 1967; Antonio Urdinola and Richard Mltl.lon, "Policies 
to Promote Colombian Ex.ports of Manufactures::, Economic Development Reports, 
No. 75, Presented at the D.A.S. Co~ference, Sorrento, Italy, September 1967; 
,
Jose Diego Teigeiro, ,:Promotion of Ifon-12:'raditiorlc.l F.,xports in Colombia11 , 
April 1970 (:mimeographed); Alberto R. 1-hsalem, ?Las Exportaciones Colombianas, 
1956-1969:t, Hay 1970 (mimeographed); Richard R. Helson, T. Paul Schultz and 
Robert L. Slighton, Structural C'nange in a DeveloDinr.: Economy: Colombia's 
Problems and Prospects (Princeton: Pr:inceton University Press, 1971), 
especially pp. 210-13; j-onathan W. Eaton, ;;Effective Devaluation as an Export 
Incentive in Less Developed Co"..l!lt:dPs ,; , P:,:-esen-::ed -~o the Department of Economics, 
Harvard University, in pe,rtial f't.:.lfilL'l'ient of the requi:re:1cents for the degree 
with honors of Bachelor of Arts, i:-Iarch 1972, Chapter 6. 
2 Data obtained from TJN-FAO-PY and UrI-FAO-TY, se~reral issues. 
3 Although this is not the place to q_umitify LAF'.::A-i!lduced trade diversion, 
it ma;y be noted that in 1969 the unit value of Colombian exports of inorsanic 
chemicals (SITC #513 and #5:1_4) to I.AFTA was 7.9 U.S. cents per net kilogram, 
compared with a corresponding ~igure of onJy 3.7 U.S. cents per kilo for non-
'LAFl'A countries, inplyir.g an average LAFTA pr~ferential margin of 116 percent 
(assuming homogeneity). 
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4 As noted by my col:..eague Benjamin I. Cohen, the expansion of import­
intensive export activities may soon call for the computation of net, rather 
than gross, exports, at least for some types of exports, particularly in 
countries which have gone d-eeply into outi--ard-oriented assembly-type activities 
with heavy use of irr.ported parts. 
5 It can be easily shewn that in a locally m•)!lOJ)olized industry selling both 
domestically and. abro1:.'.l ( a:': different :prices) a lowe:r-in; of import duties can 
lead to a contraction of exports and an exps.nsio:n of d.or.1estic sales. This 
apparentlJ' paradoxical result, however, :.s unlikely to have much practical 
The basic areument is deYeloped ir. an um.publishedrelevance over the long run. 
paper of Gonzalo Giraldo. It is similar to the a."lalysis showing that the 
imposition of a minimum wage can expand employment under conditions of labor 
monopsony .. 
6 Richard C. Porter, in his "Brith of a :Sill tJ;arket·
1 (Discussion Paper No. 11, 
Center for Research on Economic Development, The Uni,~ersi ty of Michigan, August, 
1970) has analyzed in detai.l the rele.tionshi:ps between the marginal tax and 
discount rates o:f a given firm, a11d the eJ:tent of' the export stimulus o:f:fered 
by CAT and its predecessor subsidy scheme. He shows that both CAT and the 
exemption scheme yield larger export incentives to firms with higher marginal 
tax rates and lower discount rates ( typically larger :firms); however, he 
argues that the CNr system increased the export stimulus, relative to the 
previous tax exemption, for :'irms with marginal tax rates below 37.5 percent, 
reducing it for firms with h::.gher tax rates. 
7 The advertisine; is sim.i_lar to t:iat now sponsored by the Bureau of International 
Commerce, U.S. Departnent of Commerce. See, :'or examp:e, the ad "It took a 
Texan to cool the Ja"Danese:
1 in Th~-!a~l s-~reet Journal, January 26, 1972, p. 11. 
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. 8 In earlier work Durbin-Watson statistics in supply-response regressions 
were very low. See also Eaton's thesis, mentioned in footnote 1. 
9 But in 10 years time, the increase in minor exports growing at 12.5 percent 
per annum will be 224.7 percent; the corres~onding figure for an exchange 
rate growing at 3.6 percent will be 42.4 percent. So while for the annual 
rates the ratio (elasticity) is 3.5, for the 10 year span the ratio is 5,3. 
10 Other regressions (not shown) using quarterly data, but in logarithmic 
form and with exiJlicit trend variables, yielded elasticities nearer one. 
When trend terms were excluded, the elasticities rose to about 2. 7 ( for the 
whole period). The instability index alsc perfonned well in those regressions~ 
and the R2 s were, of course, much higher with trend (around O. 85) • The Durbin-
Watson statistics, however, were always below one, often less than o. 5. Dummies 
indicated the presence of significant seasonal factors, particularly a positive 
one in the second quarter. A3 in the work of John Sheahan, in these regressions 
coefficients for the lagged exchange rate y,1ere insignificant, or had the 
wrong sign. 
A dummy variab:!.e was also in~roduced in regressions of the type presented 
in Table III-13, having R value of 1 whenever the exchange rate change was 
negative, and zero otherwise. T'nis test of possible asymmetrical responses 
to positive and negative exchange rate movements yielded no evidence for 
asymmetry; the t-statistic for the dummy was below O. 7 in all cases, and the 
signs were different among time periods. 
11 For example, during the difficult year of 1967 industrial output rose by 
only 3.6 percent, compared with a'tJ. average of 6.2 for the previous two years. 
Pure manufactured exports, however, rose in dollar value du:-ing 1967 only by 
4. 8 percent, in contrast with an average of 21. 2 percent during the previous 
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two yea.rs. It is possible that ~ore disaggregated indices of' excess capacity 
could yield better results. 
12 Applying an average CAT-inclusive exchange rate of 20.4 Pesos to the dollar 
value of those exports. 
13 These and other suggestions have been put f'orth and elaborated by the 
staff of the Colombian I'Iational Planning Department, at least since 1970. 
